The Trump Administration has completely upended European-American relations, perhaps permanently rupturing the world order as it has existed for eight decades. Last week, in Munich, Vice-President J. D. Vance stunned European diplomats by telling them that the greatest threat to their societies came from immigration and their own attempts to quarantine far-right political parties, not from Vladimir Putin. Then, a few days later, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and American negotiators met with Russian representatives in Saudi Arabia to discuss an end to the war in Ukraine. (Ukraine was not invited.) This week, Trump himself blamed Ukraine for the war, before relaying some falsehoods about Zelensky’s popularity, and calling him a dictator. (Trump also voiced support for a Russian proposal that Ukraine hold elections before being granted a role in peace talks.)
The response in Europe to this whirlwind has been a combination of panic and confusion, as European parties from the left to the center right come to grips with the fact that the Atlantic alliance could be in the process of disintegrating. To understand what this means, I recently spoke by phone with Ivan Krastev, an expert on European politics, and a permanent fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences, in Vienna. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed how Trump’s moves could affect the European far right, why the European mainstream was so feckless in preparing for Trump, and whether Trump has a grand ideological vision for how the U.S. should operate in the world.
I’ve been thinking that we might look back on this month as one of incredible significance for the European continent, akin to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, or even the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989. Have you had that thought?
Listen, like you, I see this as a major political rupture, and very much on the level of the change that we saw in 1989 and 1990. It’s in a way the end of a part of European history that started with the end of the Second World War. Many people have been comparing the Munich conference to 1938, saying Putin was being appeased, because Munich was also the site of appeasement of Hitler. I see the American government as a revolutionary government. They’re not simply trying to remake the United States—they’re going to remake the world. They’re coming in with a totally different instinct about what is to be valued and what is to be feared. From this point of view, we are in a different world.
What has been the response in Europe so far?
Trump has been signalling for a long time how he views Europe, and how he views European governments. The problem is that Europe was denying this and rejecting it and trying to hide from itself that this was going to be a revolutionary government. They were trying to remember how Europe had dealt with Trump during his first term, not recognizing the difference between Trump I and Trump II.
After Munich, the European response was predictable, and not particularly convincing. The meeting in Paris [of European leaders, called by Emmanuel Macron, the President of France, in response to the Trump Administration] on Monday didn’t go over particularly well. It is quite doubtful that Europe on its own can give the security guarantees that Ukraine needs. This meeting was meant to be kind of a gesture of strength. It was much more seen as a gesture of weakness. In general, European politicians are very predictable. And predictability is a very strong trait in a normal situation. But in a situation of turmoil and crisis, like the one we have now, predictability is self-defeating.
The nature of European politics is changing. Before, people talked about liberals, anti-liberals, globalists, nationalists. Now we’re going to end up with a clash between two different types of nationalists. On the far right, you’re going to see a Trumpian right. They see Trump as a model, and they’re very much anti-liberal, anti-woke, with vague talk about a Christian legacy in Europe. On the other side, as a result of Munich, you will see the emergence of a kind of a don’t-bully-us European mainstream, which basically is trying to make its legitimacy with the voters by resisting American policies. We know this very well in other parts of the world. But now we are seeing this in Canada, and we are seeing this in Denmark. You have even been seeing this in Germany, during the last debate before the German elections. All the mainstream politicians were sounding tougher and more aggressive toward America. Yesterday’s American allies in the center—be it center left or center right—are going to use the language of national dignity and national interest much more, and look for legitimacy by fighting American policies.
Do you think that at least for a while Trump’s behavior will create political problems for the far right in Europe?
Yes, totally. There are also tensions between parts of the European far right. Nationalism has a history in Europe, so for [the French far-right leader] Marine Le Pen to listen to Vance praising the [German far-right] AfD could not have been easy. She didn’t allow the AfD to become part of the far-right grouping in the European Parliament, because much of French nationalism, even when antisemitic, is anti-German.
The far right in general is going to be pushed in different directions because of Trump. On Ukraine, of course, the far right is supporting Trump in his peace effort. But one of the results of a deal like the one Trump is pursuing would be a major wave of Ukrainian immigrants into the rest of Europe. If Ukrainians decide that their country is done and Americans are not going to give guarantees and the Russians are going to dominate, you can expect many of them going into Europe, many of them trying to join their families who are already there, and many of the new migrants are going to be men—ex-soldiers. The far right doesn’t want immigrants coming, even when they are from Eastern Europe. So, from this point of view, it’s going to be very difficult for them to explain to their own voters what is good about Trump’s policies. And this is why I believe we are going to see a major restructuring of European politics.
The mainstream parties, which yesterday were very internationalist, very much tried to bet that the status quo was not really dead. They were talking as if nothing had happened. After Munich, nobody can do this. Even before it. But now to pretend that nothing has happened makes you simply too ridiculous. This is going to change a lot of domestic politics.
It seems like essentially you believe that this will create problems for the far right. And now the left and the center can’t deny that politics has changed. But it does seem that the mainstream parties really are just too weak in some fundamental sense to respond in a cohesive, coherent way. How concerned are you about that?
I’m very concerned. The European élites are under pressure because economically Europe is a problem. Geopolitically, Europe suddenly finds itself quite irrelevant and marginalized, and people are going to blame the mainstream parties for this. Another very important question is, what will Trumpian nationalism look like here? Is it going to be about the nation state? Is it going to be about Europe? To what extent? There is also the fact that he is very unpopular in Western Europe, but in some of the Eastern European countries there is more sympathy for Trump, and there is much more sympathy for his policies. So we may see more fragmentation of the continent.
In terms of the mainstream reaction, American security guarantees not only for Ukraine but also for Europe now cannot be taken for granted. And, of course, Europe is going to talk about larger defense budgets. But you cannot change the situation in the course of months or even in two or three years. And the military incapability of Europe is not simply a problem of defense budgets. It’s very much a cultural issue. In a paradoxical way, Europe is threatened not by its failures but by its successes. The European Union managed to convince Europeans that a major war was not possible in Europe anymore. And now, when basically there is a risk of such a war, there is a need for cultural change in Europe. And as you know cultural change takes time. I expect the period of confusion to continue and for different places, different countries, and different governments to react differently. Europe is going to be reduced to a kind of outraged paralysis, because to be outraged is not a policy.
