Global Humidity Sensors Industry

Global Humidity Sensors Industry


Global Humidity Sensors Market to Reach $2. 3 Billion by 2027. Amid the COVID-19 crisis, the global market for Humidity Sensors estimated at US$1. 1 Billion in the year 2020, is projected to reach a revised size of US$2.

New York, Feb. 24, 2021 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Reportlinker.com announces the release of the report “Global Humidity Sensors Industry” – https://www.reportlinker.com/p05956990/?utm_source=GNW
3 Billion by 2027, growing at a CAGR of 10.6% over the analysis period 2020-2027. Industrial Applications, one of the segments analyzed in the report, is projected to record a 10% CAGR and reach US$802.1 Million by the end of the analysis period. After an early analysis of the business implications of the pandemic and its induced economic crisis, growth in the Consumer Electronics segment is readjusted to a revised 10.2% CAGR for the next 7-year period.

The U.S. Market is Estimated at $307.7 Million, While China is Forecast to Grow at 13.9% CAGR

The Humidity Sensors market in the U.S. is estimated at US$307.7 Million in the year 2020. China, the world`s second largest economy, is forecast to reach a projected market size of US$489.8 Million by the year 2027 trailing a CAGR of 13.9% over the analysis period 2020 to 2027. Among the other noteworthy geographic markets are Japan and Canada, each forecast to grow at 7.4% and 9.1% respectively over the 2020-2027 period. Within Europe, Germany is forecast to grow at approximately 8.3% CAGR.

HVAC Systems Segment to Record 12.2% CAGR

In the global HVAC Systems segment, USA, Canada, Japan, China and Europe will drive the 11.4% CAGR estimated for this segment. These regional markets accounting for a combined market size of US$129.7 Million in the year 2020 will reach a projected size of US$276 Million by the close of the analysis period. China will remain among the fastest growing in this cluster of regional markets. Led by countries such as Australia, India, and South Korea, the market in Asia-Pacific is forecast to reach US$335 Million by the year 2027, while Latin America will expand at a 13.7% CAGR through the analysis period. We bring years of research experience to this 7th edition of our report. The 206-page report presents concise insights into how the pandemic has impacted production and the buy side for 2020 and 2021. A short-term phased recovery by key geography is also addressed.

Competitors identified in this market include, among others,

Read the full report: https://www.reportlinker.com/p05956990/?utm_source=GNW

I. INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY & REPORT SCOPE

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. MARKET OVERVIEW
Global Competitor Market Shares
Humidity Sensor Competitor Market Share Scenario Worldwide
(in %): 2019 & 2025
Impact of Covid-19 and a Looming Global Recession

2. FOCUS ON SELECT PLAYERS

3. MARKET TRENDS & DRIVERS

4. GLOBAL MARKET PERSPECTIVE
Table 1: Humidity Sensors Global Market Estimates and Forecasts
in US$ Thousand by Region/Country: 2020-2027

Table 2: Humidity Sensors Global Retrospective Market Scenario
in US$ Thousand by Region/Country: 2012-2019

Table 3: Humidity Sensors Market Share Shift across Key
Geographies Worldwide: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

Table 4: Industrial Applications (End-Use) Global Opportunity
Assessment in US$ Thousand by Region/Country: 2020-2027

Table 5: Industrial Applications (End-Use) Historic Sales
Analysis in US$ Thousand by Region/Country: 2012-2019

Table 6: Industrial Applications (End-Use) Percentage Share
Breakdown of Global Sales by Region/Country: 2012 VS 2020 VS
2027

Table 7: Consumer Electronics (End-Use) Worldwide Sales in US$
Thousand by Region/Country: 2020-2027

Table 8: Consumer Electronics (End-Use) Historic Demand
Patterns in US$ Thousand by Region/Country: 2012-2019

Table 9: Consumer Electronics (End-Use) Market Share Shift
across Key Geographies: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

Table 10: HVAC Systems (End-Use) Global Market Estimates &
Forecasts in US$ Thousand by Region/Country: 2020-2027

Table 11: HVAC Systems (End-Use) Retrospective Demand Analysis
in US$ Thousand by Region/Country: 2012-2019

Table 12: HVAC Systems (End-Use) Market Share Breakdown by
Region/Country: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

Table 13: Climate & Test Chambers (End-Use) Demand Potential
Worldwide in US$ Thousand by Region/Country: 2020-2027

Table 14: Climate & Test Chambers (End-Use) Historic Sales
Analysis in US$ Thousand by Region/Country: 2012-2019

Table 15: Climate & Test Chambers (End-Use) Share Breakdown
Review by Region/Country: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

Table 16: Oil & Gas (End-Use) Worldwide Latent Demand Forecasts
in US$ Thousand by Region/Country: 2020-2027

Table 17: Oil & Gas (End-Use) Global Historic Analysis in US$
Thousand by Region/Country: 2012-2019

Table 18: Oil & Gas (End-Use) Distribution of Global Sales by
Region/Country: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

Table 19: Other End-Uses (End-Use) Sales Estimates and
Forecasts in US$ Thousand by Region/Country for the Years 2020
through 2027

Table 20: Other End-Uses (End-Use) Analysis of Historic Sales
in US$ Thousand by Region/Country for the Years 2012 to 2019

Table 21: Other End-Uses (End-Use) Global Market Share
Distribution by Region/Country for 2012, 2020, and 2027

III. MARKET ANALYSIS

GEOGRAPHIC MARKET ANALYSIS

UNITED STATES
Market Facts & Figures
US Humidity Sensor Market Share (in %) by Company: 2019 & 2025
Market Analytics
Table 22: United States Humidity Sensors Latent Demand
Forecasts in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020 to 2027

Table 23: Humidity Sensors Historic Demand Patterns in the
United States by End-Use in US$ Thousand for 2012-2019

Table 24: Humidity Sensors Market Share Breakdown in the United
States by End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

CANADA
Table 25: Canadian Humidity Sensors Market Quantitative Demand
Analysis in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020 to 2027

Table 26: Humidity Sensors Market in Canada: Summarization of
Historic Demand Patterns in US$ Thousand by End-Use for
2012-2019

Table 27: Canadian Humidity Sensors Market Share Analysis by
End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

JAPAN
Table 28: Japanese Demand Estimates and Forecasts for Humidity
Sensors in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020 to 2027

Table 29: Japanese Humidity Sensors Market in US$ Thousand by
End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 30: Humidity Sensors Market Share Shift in Japan by
End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

CHINA
Table 31: Chinese Demand for Humidity Sensors in US$ Thousand
by End-Use: 2020 to 2027

Table 32: Humidity Sensors Market Review in China in US$
Thousand by End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 33: Chinese Humidity Sensors Market Share Breakdown by
End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

EUROPE
Market Facts & Figures
European Humidity Sensor Market: Competitor Market Share
Scenario (in %) for 2019 & 2025
Market Analytics
Table 34: European Humidity Sensors Market Demand Scenario in
US$ Thousand by Region/Country: 2020-2027

Table 35: Humidity Sensors Market in Europe: A Historic Market
Perspective in US$ Thousand by Region/Country for the Period
2012-2019

Table 36: European Humidity Sensors Market Share Shift by
Region/Country: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

Table 37: European Humidity Sensors Addressable Market
Opportunity in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020-2027

Table 38: Humidity Sensors Market in Europe: Summarization of
Historic Demand in US$ Thousand by End-Use for the Period
2012-2019

Table 39: European Humidity Sensors Market Share Analysis by
End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

FRANCE
Table 40: Humidity Sensors Quantitative Demand Analysis in
France in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020-2027

Table 41: French Humidity Sensors Historic Market Review in US$
Thousand by End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 42: French Humidity Sensors Market Share Analysis:
A 17-Year Perspective by End-Use for 2012, 2020, and 2027

GERMANY
Table 43: Humidity Sensors Market in Germany: Annual Sales
Estimates and Forecasts in US$ Thousand by End-Use for the
Period 2020-2027

Table 44: German Humidity Sensors Market in Retrospect in US$
Thousand by End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 45: Humidity Sensors Market Share Distribution in Germany
by End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

ITALY
Table 46: Italian Demand for Humidity Sensors in US$ Thousand
by End-Use: 2020 to 2027

Table 47: Humidity Sensors Market Review in Italy in US$
Thousand by End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 48: Italian Humidity Sensors Market Share Breakdown by
End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

UNITED KINGDOM
Table 49: United Kingdom Demand Estimates and Forecasts for
Humidity Sensors in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020 to 2027

Table 50: United Kingdom Humidity Sensors Market in US$
Thousand by End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 51: Humidity Sensors Market Share Shift in the United
Kingdom by End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

SPAIN
Table 52: Spanish Humidity Sensors Market Quantitative Demand
Analysis in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020 to 2027

Table 53: Humidity Sensors Market in Spain: Summarization of
Historic Demand Patterns in US$ Thousand by End-Use for
2012-2019

Table 54: Spanish Humidity Sensors Market Share Analysis by
End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

RUSSIA
Table 55: Russian Humidity Sensors Latent Demand Forecasts in
US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020 to 2027

Table 56: Humidity Sensors Historic Demand Patterns in Russia
by End-Use in US$ Thousand for 2012-2019

Table 57: Humidity Sensors Market Share Breakdown in Russia by
End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

REST OF EUROPE
Table 58: Rest of Europe Humidity Sensors Addressable Market
Opportunity in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020-2027

Table 59: Humidity Sensors Market in Rest of Europe:
Summarization of Historic Demand in US$ Thousand by End-Use for
the Period 2012-2019

Table 60: Rest of Europe Humidity Sensors Market Share Analysis
by End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

ASIA-PACIFIC
Table 61: Asia-Pacific Humidity Sensors Market Estimates and
Forecasts in US$ Thousand by Region/Country: 2020-2027

Table 62: Humidity Sensors Market in Asia-Pacific: Historic
Market Analysis in US$ Thousand by Region/Country for the
Period 2012-2019

Table 63: Asia-Pacific Humidity Sensors Market Share Analysis
by Region/Country: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

Table 64: Humidity Sensors Quantitative Demand Analysis in
Asia-Pacific in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020-2027

Table 65: Asia-Pacific Humidity Sensors Historic Market Review
in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 66: Asia-Pacific Humidity Sensors Market Share Analysis:
A 17-Year Perspectiveby End-Use for 2012, 2020, and 2027

AUSTRALIA
Table 67: Humidity Sensors Market in Australia: Annual Sales
Estimates and Forecasts in US$ Thousand by End-Use for the
Period 2020-2027

Table 68: Australian Humidity Sensors Market in Retrospect in
US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 69: Humidity Sensors Market Share Distribution in
Australia by End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

INDIA
Table 70: Indian Humidity Sensors Market Quantitative Demand
Analysis in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020 to 2027

Table 71: Humidity Sensors Market in India: Summarization of
Historic Demand Patterns in US$ Thousand by End-Use for
2012-2019

Table 72: Indian Humidity Sensors Market Share Analysis by
End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

SOUTH KOREA
Table 73: Humidity Sensors Market in South Korea: Recent Past,
Current and Future Analysis in US$ Thousand by End-Use for the
Period 2020-2027

Table 74: South Korean Humidity Sensors Historic Market
Analysis in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 75: Humidity Sensors Market Share Distribution in South
Korea by End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

REST OF ASIA-PACIFIC
Table 76: Rest of Asia-Pacific Demand Estimates and Forecasts
for Humidity Sensors in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020 to 2027

Table 77: Rest of Asia-Pacific Humidity Sensors Market in US$
Thousand by End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 78: Humidity Sensors Market Share Shift in Rest of
Asia-Pacific by End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

LATIN AMERICA
Table 79: Latin American Humidity Sensors Market Trends by
Region/Country in US$ Thousand: 2020-2027

Table 80: Humidity Sensors Market in Latin America in US$
Thousand by Region/Country: A Historic Perspective for the
Period 2012-2019

Table 81: Latin American Humidity Sensors Market Percentage
Breakdown of Sales by Region/Country: 2012, 2020, and 2027

Table 82: Latin American Demand for Humidity Sensors in US$
Thousand by End-Use: 2020 to 2027

Table 83: Humidity Sensors Market Review in Latin America in
US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 84: Latin American Humidity Sensors Market Share
Breakdown by End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

ARGENTINA
Table 85: Argentinean Humidity Sensors Addressable Market
Opportunity in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020-2027

Table 86: Humidity Sensors Market in Argentina: Summarization
of Historic Demand in US$ Thousand by End-Use for the Period
2012-2019

Table 87: Argentinean Humidity Sensors Market Share Analysis by
End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

BRAZIL
Table 88: Humidity Sensors Quantitative Demand Analysis in
Brazil in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020-2027

Table 89: Brazilian Humidity Sensors Historic Market Review in
US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 90: Brazilian Humidity Sensors Market Share Analysis:
A 17-Year Perspective by End-Use for 2012, 2020, and 2027

MEXICO
Table 91: Humidity Sensors Market in Mexico: Annual Sales
Estimates and Forecasts in US$ Thousand by End-Use for the
Period 2020-2027

Table 92: Mexican Humidity Sensors Market in Retrospect in US$
Thousand by End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 93: Humidity Sensors Market Share Distribution in Mexico
by End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

REST OF LATIN AMERICA
Table 94: Rest of Latin America Humidity Sensors Latent Demand
Forecasts in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020 to 2027

Table 95: Humidity Sensors Historic Demand Patterns in Rest of
Latin America by End-Use in US$ Thousand for 2012-2019

Table 96: Humidity Sensors Market Share Breakdown in Rest of
Latin America by End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

MIDDLE EAST
Table 97: The Middle East Humidity Sensors Market Estimates and
Forecasts in US$ Thousand by Region/Country: 2020-2027

Table 98: Humidity Sensors Market in the Middle East by
Region/Country in US$ Thousand: 2012-2019

Table 99: The Middle East Humidity Sensors Market Share
Breakdown by Region/Country: 2012, 2020, and 2027

Table 100: The Middle East Humidity Sensors Market Quantitative
Demand Analysis in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020 to 2027

Table 101: Humidity Sensors Market in the Middle East:
Summarization of Historic Demand Patterns in US$ Thousand by
End-Use for 2012-2019

Table 102: The Middle East Humidity Sensors Market Share
Analysis by End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

IRAN
Table 103: Iranian Demand Estimates and Forecasts for Humidity
Sensors in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020 to 2027

Table 104: Iranian Humidity Sensors Market in US$ Thousand by
End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 105: Humidity Sensors Market Share Shift in Iran by
End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

ISRAEL
Table 106: Israeli Humidity Sensors Addressable Market
Opportunity in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020-2027

Table 107: Humidity Sensors Market in Israel: Summarization of
Historic Demand in US$ Thousand by End-Use for the Period
2012-2019

Table 108: Israeli Humidity Sensors Market Share Analysis by
End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

SAUDI ARABIA
Table 109: Saudi Arabian Demand for Humidity Sensors in US$
Thousand by End-Use: 2020 to 2027

Table 110: Humidity Sensors Market Review in Saudi Arabia in
US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 111: Saudi Arabian Humidity Sensors Market Share
Breakdown by End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Table 112: Humidity Sensors Market in the United Arab Emirates:
Recent Past, Current and Future Analysis in US$ Thousand by
End-Use for the Period 2020-2027

Table 113: United Arab Emirates Humidity Sensors Historic
Market Analysis in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 114: Humidity Sensors Market Share Distribution in United
Arab Emirates by End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

REST OF MIDDLE EAST
Table 115: Humidity Sensors Market in Rest of Middle East:
Annual Sales Estimates and Forecasts in US$ Thousand by End-Use
for the Period 2020-2027

Table 116: Rest of Middle East Humidity Sensors Market in
Retrospect in US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2012-2019

Table 117: Humidity Sensors Market Share Distribution in Rest
of Middle East by End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

AFRICA
Table 118: African Humidity Sensors Latent Demand Forecasts in
US$ Thousand by End-Use: 2020 to 2027

Table 119: Humidity Sensors Historic Demand Patterns in Africa
by End-Use in US$ Thousand for 2012-2019

Table 120: Humidity Sensors Market Share Breakdown in Africa by
End-Use: 2012 VS 2020 VS 2027

IV. COMPETITION
Total Companies Profiled: 56
Read the full report: https://www.reportlinker.com/p05956990/?utm_source=GNW

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Why The Intelligence Community Needs a Climate Change Task Force

Why The Intelligence Community Needs a Climate Change Task Force


Kristin Wood, Sr. Climate Editor, The Cipher Brief

Kristin Wood is the Senior Climate Editor for The Cipher Brief, a Cipher Brief expert, a non-resident fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs’ Intelligence Project, and a former senior CIA officer with 20 years of experience in analysis, operations, and innovation and technology.

Erin Sikorsky, Deputy Director, Center for Climate and Security

Erin Sikorsky is the Deputy Director of the Center for Climate and Security (CCS), the Director of the International Military Council on Climate and Security(IMCCS), and an adjunct professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy & Government. Previously, she served as the Deputy Director of the Strategic Futures Group on the US National Intelligence Council (NIC). Ms. Sikorsky worked in the US intelligence community for over a decade.

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — President Biden’s 27 January Executive Order (EO) on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad demonstrates a strong commitment to preparing the United States for addressing the climate crisis. It assigns experienced climate experts into powerful new roles and issues extensive orders for a whole-of-government response. This article analyzes the Intelligence Community aspects of the EO.

For national security agencies, the EO orders agencies to assess within 90 days:

—  Climate impacts relevant to broad agency strategies in particular countries or regions;

—  Climate impacts on their agency-managed infrastructure abroad (e.g., embassies, military installations), without prejudice to existing requirements regarding assessment of such infrastructure;

—  How the agency intends to manage such impacts or incorporate risk mitigation into its installation master plans; and

—   How the agency’s international work, including partner engagement, can contribute to addressing the climate crisis.

Fully maximizing the effectiveness of the 18 IC agencies’ individual responses to the EO will require a coordinated strategy. While the EO calls for a National Intelligence Estimate on climate change, representing coordinated analysis among all agencies is only one piece of the puzzle.

Building a true climate security intelligence strategy will require an evaluation of how the IC’s core missions of collection and analysis can contribute to addressing climate threats. This will require an assessment of the IC’s people, programs and policies as well as what is missing, what needs to be adjusted, and what new skills, capabilities and resources are required.

The overriding question for collection and analysis is: what decision advantage can the IC offer the President when it comes to climate issues?  What unique climate change-related information can the intelligence community collect and analyze that would serve US national security? Are there new forms of collection and analysis, especially scientific analysis needed? How could the CIA’s unique capabilities, for example, be brought to bear? A rigorous process aimed at answering these questions should examine what new requirements need to be levied, what new sources HUMINT, SIGINT, and other collectors need to find, and what partnerships need to be deepened or created.

To conduct this evaluation, we suggest creating an ODNI National Security and Climate Change Task Force that looks at each agency’s contributions to the EO and stitches them into a whole-of-IC approach to climate across all missions. A blue-ribbon panel of climate and security experts from both outside and inside government would offer a fresh perspective on how the IC could best contribute to tackling this mission.  In addition to offering expertise that mostly resides outside the IC, external participants would be a check on agencies’ tendencies, which we’ve experienced multiple times over the decades, to relabel existing entities with a new name as an answer to executive requirements.

Such a task force is likely to identify necessary adjustments to IC spending, personnel, and infrastructure. Additional leadership positions or new structures within agencies may be needed to implement task force recommendations in the longer term. For example, better integration of climate modeling and data, open-source collection, and classified information may require new tools and new teams to fully implement. On top of adjustments to collection and analysis, the IC also must consider direct climate change risks to its facilities and infrastructure. Therefore, the task force should include an IC Climate Resilience and Adaptation Subcommittee with finance, facilities and security expertise.

We offer below some issues such a task force could consider, drawn from engagements with hundreds of experts on climate security issues over the past few years:

  • IC strategic foresight and early warning capabilities and talent have been diminished over time by other priorities. They are very much needed to support threat anticipation and preparedness on a range of intersecting risks linked to climate change, from water and food insecurity, regional conflicts, infectious diseases, and natural disasters. Global trends work — often relegated to the physical and metaphorical basement — needs to be front and center. The Biden Administration has already signaled its prioritization of a more integrated approach to monitoring global threats by its call for the creation of a National Center for Epidemic Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics to modernize global early warning and trigger systems to prevent, detect, and respond to biological threats. The types of contributions the IC would make to such a center could and should be replicated in the climate security realm.
  • Climate security risks also create opportunities to use the CIA’s unique overseas partnerships in new ways. CIA stations and bases would be ideal leadership nodes for partnering on climate change, allowing the Agency to tap into existing liaison relationships to generate projections that no one else could. The CIA could play a critical role in helping US policymakers understand other countries’ plans and intentions to respond to climate security threats. Additionally, climate change could be an area of partnership with countries such as Russia and China.
  • While conducting climate science within the US government will remain the purview of scientific agencies such as NOAA, NASA, and others, IC agencies need more personnel with scientific literacy and backgrounds. At a minimum, agencies will need more climate scientists on their teams and closer partnerships with them so that deep scientific understanding is included in collection requirements and analytic writing.

Finally, we note the National Climate Task Force created by the EO does not include the DNI as a member. While that seems a logical choice as the task force is focused domestically, the reality is that the division between foreign and domestic operations just doesn’t work for climate. For example, the IC can answer foreign policy and homeland security questions on topics such as prospects for climate-expanded migration to US borders, actual versus publicly provided achievement of other countries’ climate objectives, among many other things. The IC can also leverage its unique capabilities to understand how other actors are responding to climate change effects–i.e., not just what will they do in emissions negotiations, but explain how issues such as water scarcity concerns drive Chinese foreign policy in the region.

As President Biden said when signing the climate executive order last month, his action made “it official that climate change will be the center of our national security and foreign policy.” The security threats posed by climate change grow with each passing day and addressing them requires innovation and new conceptions of national security. As it has so many times before, on many different threats, the IC can and should step up to play a leading, transformative role on climate security risks, integrating across missions to deliver the most insightful analysis possible in support of the President’s directive and in service to the American people.

Read more expert-driven national security analysis, perspective and opinion in The Cipher Brief





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Mexico to Ban Glyphosate, GM Corn Presidential Decree Comes Despite Intense Pressure from Industry, U.S. Authorities — Global Issues

Mexico to Ban Glyphosate, GM Corn Presidential Decree Comes Despite Intense Pressure from Industry, U.S. Authorities — Global Issues


Tractor caravan to Mexico City farmer protest demands “Mexico Free of Transgenics”. Credit: Enrique Perez S./ANEC
  • Opinion by Timothy A. Wise (cambridge ma)
  • Inter Press Service

The bold policy moves fulfill a campaign promise by Mexico’s populist president, whose agricultural policies have begun to favor Mexican producers, particularly small-scale farmers, and protect consumers alarmed by the rise of obesity and chronic diseases associated with high-fat, high-sugar processed foods.

In banning glyphosate, the decree cites the precautionary principle and the growing body of scientific research showing the dangers of the chemical, the active ingredient in Bayer/Monsanto’s Roundup herbicide. The government had stopped imports of glyphosate since late 2019, citing the World Health Organization’s warning that the chemical is a “probable carcinogen.”

The prohibitions on genetically modified corn, which appear toward the end of the decree, have more profound implications. The immediate ban on permits for cultivation of GM corn formalizes current restrictions, ordered by Mexican courts in 2013 when a citizen lawsuit challenged government permitting of experimental GM corn planting by Monsanto and other multinational seed companies on the grounds of the contamination threat they posed to Mexico’s rich store of native corn varieties. The import ban cites the same environmental threats but goes further, advancing the López Obrador administration’s goals of promoting greater food self-sufficiency in key crops. As the decree states:

“ith the objective of achieving self-sufficiency and food sovereignty, our country must be oriented towards establishing sustainable and culturally adequate agricultural production, through the use of agroecological practices and inputs that are safe for human health, the country’s biocultural diversity and the environment, as well as congruent with the agricultural traditions of Mexico.”

Chronicle of a decree foretold

Such policies should come as no surprise. In his campaign, López Obrador committed to such measures. Unprecedented support from rural voters were critical to his landslide 2019 electoral victory, with his new Movement for National Renewal (Morena) claiming majorities in both houses of Congress.

Still, industry and U.S. government officials seemed shocked that their lobbying had failed to stop López Obrador from acting. The pressure campaign was intense, as Carey Gillam explained in a February 16 Guardian expose on efforts by Bayer/Monsanto, industry lobbyist CropLife, and U.S. government officials to deter the glyphosate ban. According to email correspondence obtained by the Center for Biological Diversity through Freedom of Information Act requests, officials in the Trump Administration’s Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Agriculture and office of the U.S. Trade Representative were in touch with Bayer representatives and warned Mexican officials that restrictions could be in violation of the revised North American Free Trade Agreement, now rebranded by the Trump Administration as the U.S. Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA).

According to the emails, CropLife president Chris Novak last March sent a letter to Robert Lighthizer, USTR’s ambassador, arguing that Mexico’s actions would be “incompatible with Mexico’s obligations under USMCA.” In May, Lighthizer followed through, writing to Graciela Márquez Colín, Mexico’s minister of economy, warning that GMO crop and glyphosate matters threatened to undermine “the strength of our bilateral relationship.” An earlier communication argued that Mexico’s actions on glyphosate, which Mexico had ceased importing, were “without a clear scientific justification.”

Nothing could be further from the truth, according to Victor Suárez, Mexico’s Undersecretary of Agriculture for Food and Competitiveness. “There is rigorous scientific evidence of the toxicity of this herbicide,” he told me, citing the WHO findings and an extensive literature review carried out by Mexico’s biosafety commission Cibiogem.

And even though most imported U.S. corn is used for animal feed, not direct human consumption, a study carried out by María Elena Álvarez-Buylla, now head of CONACYT, the government’s leading scientific body, documented the presence of GM corn sequences in many of Mexico’s most common foods. Some 90% of tortillas and 82% of other common corn-based foods contained GM corn. Mexico needs to be especially cautious, according to Suárez, because corn is so widely consumed, with Mexicans on average eating one pound of corn a day, one of the highest consumption levels in the world.

While the glyphosate restrictions are based on concerns about human health and the environment, the phaseout of GM corn is justified additionally on the basis of the threat of contamination of Mexico’s native corn varieties and the traditional intercropped milpa. The final article in the decree states the purpose is to contribute “to food security and sovereignty” and to offer “a special measure of protection to native corn.”

The ban on GM corn cultivation has been a longstanding demand ever since the previous administration of Enrique Peña Nieto granted permission to Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta and a host of other multinational seed companies to begin experimental planting in northern Mexico. Such permits were halted in 2013 by a Mexico court injunction based on a claim from 53 farmer, consumer and environmental organizations – the self-denominated Demanda Colectiva – that GM corn cultivation threatened to contaminate native varieties of corn through inadvertent cross-pollination.

“It is difficult to imagine a worse place to grow GM corn than Mexico,” said Adelita San Vicente, the lead spokesperson for the plaintiffs who is now working in López Obrador’s environment ministry, when I interviewed her in 2014 for my book, Eating Tomorrow (which includes a chapter on the GM corn issue). Such contamination was well-documented and the courts issued the injunction citing the potential for permanent damage to the environment.

As Judge Walter Arrellano Hobelsberger wrote in a 2014 decision, “The use and enjoyment of biodiversity is the right of present and future generations.”

Mexico’s self-sufficiency campaign

Mexico’s farmer and environmental organizations were quick to praise the decree, though many warned that it is only a first step and implementation will be key. “These are important steps in moving toward ecological production that preserves biodiversity and agrobiodiversity forged by small-scale farmers over millennia,” wrote Greenpeace Mexico and the coalition “Without Corn There is No Country.”

Malin Jonsson of Semillas de Vida (Seeds of Life), one of the plaintiffs in the court case, told me, “This is a first step toward eliminating glyphosate, withdrawing permits for GM maize cultivation and eliminating the consumption of GM maize. To end consumption we have to stop importing GM maize from the United States by increasing Mexico’s maize production.”

Mexico imports about 30% of its corn each year, overwhelmingly from the United States. Almost all of that is yellow corn for animal feed and industrial uses. López Obrador’s commitment to reducing and, by 2024, eliminating such imports reflects his administration’s plan to ramp up Mexican production as part of the campaign to increase self-sufficiency in corn and other key food crops – wheat, rice, beans, and dairy. Mexican farmers have long complained that since NAFTA was enacted in 1994 ultra-cheap U.S. corn has driven down prices for Mexican farmers. The proposed import restrictions would help López Obrador’s “Mexico First” agricultural policies while bringing needed development to rural areas.

Will Biden Administration block action?

Industry organizations on both sides of the border have complained bitterly about the proposed bans. “The import of genetically modified grain from the U.S. is essential for many products in the agrifood chain,” said Laura Tamayo, spokeswoman for Mexico’s National Farm Council (CNA), who is also a regional corporate director for Bayer. Bayer’s agrochemical unit Monsanto makes weedkiller Roundup and the GMO corn designed to be used with the pesticide.

“This decree is completely divorced from reality,” said José Cacho, president of Mexico’s corn industry chamber CANAMI, the 25-company group that includes top corn millers like Gruma, cereal maker Kellogg, and commodity trader Cargill.

Juan Cortina, president of CNA, said his members might sue the government over the bans. “I think there will need to be legal challenges brought by all the people who use glyphosate and genetically-modified corn,” he told Reuters, adding that he also expects U.S. exporters to appeal to provisions of the USMCA trade pact to have the measures declared illegal.

Industry sources also warned that Mexico would never be able to meet its corn needs without U.S. exports and that U.S. farmers would be harmed by the presumed loss of the Mexican export market. Others quickly pointed out that Mexico was not banning U.S. exports, just GM corn exports. U.S. farmers are perfectly capable of producing non-GM corn at comparable prices, according to seed industry sources, so the ruling could encourage the development of a premium market in the United States for non-GMO corn, something U.S. consumers have been demanding for years.

Such pressures may present an early test for President Joe Biden and his nominee for U.S. Trade Representative, Katherine Tai, whose confirmation hearing is scheduled for February 25. Tai won high marks for helping get stricter labor and environmental provisions into the agreement that replaced NAFTA. Will she and the Biden administration respect Mexico’s sovereign right to enact policies designed to protect the Mexican public and the environment while promoting Mexican rural development?

Victor Suárez certainly hopes so. “Our rationale is based on the precautionary principle in the face of environmental risks as well as the right of the Mexican government to take action in favor of the public good, in important areas such as public health and the environment,” he told me.

“We are a sovereign nation with a democratic government,” he continued, “which came to power with the support of the majority of citizens, one that places compliance with our constitution and respect for human rights above all private interests.”

Timothy A. Wise is a senior advisor with the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy and the author of Eating Tomorrow: Agribusiness, Family Farmers, and the Battle for the Future of Food.

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© Inter Press Service (2021) — All Rights ReservedOriginal source: Inter Press Service





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What Happened to the Afghan Peace Talks?

What Happened to the Afghan Peace Talks?


The peace talks between the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban were set to resume in Doha, Qatar on January 6, 2021. Yet, to date, the talks have not restarted, except for minor meetings of staff over issues of protocol. The failure to restart the talks is in part because both sides are waiting to see what the Biden administration is going to do, especially whether or not the United States will abide by the agreement the Trump administration struck with the Taliban in February of 2020. This agreement called, among other things, for the withdrawal of all United States troops from Afghanistan by May 2021. In the meantime, the violence in Afghanistan continues unabated, with the killing of politicians, journalists, peace workers, and university students. The government of Ashraf Ghani seems unable, or unwilling, to stop this carnage as his government faces increasing pressure to form an interim government. All of this is taking place while the Covid-19 virus continues to ravage this poor country.

What will Biden do?

It had been expected that the Biden administration would be slow getting around to Afghanistan, given so many other pressing issues in the world. However, Biden’s team has moved quickly. The first contact with the Afghan government came just two days after the presidential inauguration on January 22, 2021, when Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan called his Afghan counterpart, Afghan National Security Advisor Hamdullah Mohib. According to the readout of the call, Sullivan indicated to Mohib that the United States intends to review the February agreement with the intent to assess whether or not the Taliban was living up to its side of the deal to cut ties with terrorist groups, especially al Qaeda, reducing violence and making progress on peace talks with the Afghan government (Afzal, 2021; Bezhan, 2021).

President Biden also formed a working group of high-level American government officials and experts to advise him on this issue. This blue-ribbon study group, co-chaired by retired General Joseph Dunford, urged Biden to abandon the agreement that Trump had signed with the Taliban that would bring all of the remaining United States troops out of Afghanistan by May of this year. If the United States were to pull out all of its troops by May, the study group reported, the possibility for civil war in Afghanistan would be high and the Ghani government would certainly collapse (Ignatius, 2021).

President Biden has also decided to keep, for the time being, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad who served the Trump administration as the Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation and who was the main negotiator of the talks with the Taliban and the major author of the February 2020 peace agreement. Khalilzad has an impressive resume. He was the United States Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2004 to 2005 and was the United States Ambassador to the United Nations from 2007 to 2009 under the Bush administration. Khalilzad has the advantage of being an Afghan-American and is able to talk with the Taliban in their own language. However, while he gets on well with the Taliban, he does not get along well with President Ghani who feels that Khalilzad has ignored him in the negotiations with the Taliban. In addition, Khalilzad is a Republican, a Trump appointee, and has served under the Bush administration. He may, therefore, be politically out of step with the new administration.

The Biden team’s attempt to renegotiate the February 2020 agreement with the Taliban has several purposes. For one, the agreement was negotiated and signed by the Trump administration and therefore may not be considered valid by the Biden team. More importantly, if the negotiations are successful, it will give the Biden administration additional time to reconsider the troop withdrawal. It is also felt that the Taliban have not lived up to their part of the deal to cut ties with al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. However, walking away from the February agreement will mean abrogating the contract that the United States signed with the Taliban, and may well lead to increased attacks on United States forces. There have been no attacks on American forces since the agreement and, as a result, no causalities.

The Intra-Afghan Negotiations in Doha

The negotiations between the Afghan Government and the Taliban were to restart after a month-long break on January 6, 2021. However, to date, there has been no progress except for meetings of minor staff over issues of protocol. Most of the senior officials of the parties have returned home: to Kabul in the case of the government negotiators, and to Pakistan in the case of the Taliban side. Clearly, both sides are waiting to see what Biden’s team will do, but the negotiations are also stalled because both sides have goals that are incompatible with the other side. The Taliban, which believes that it has essentially won the war, is willing to wait for the withdrawal of American troops as agreed upon with the United States in the February 2020 agreement. With the American troops gone, the Taliban believe that the Ghani government cannot survive and that they will be able to take over Afghanistan.

The Taliban’s long-term goal in the negotiations, which is not clearly stated, is to create an Islamic Caliphate in Afghanistan. This can mean several things, but essentially is a form of government based on Islamic principles and overseen by a council of Islamic scholars who would approve or disapprove governmental actions. While this structure appears similar to that in Iran, the Taliban do not favor democratic elections like those that take place in Iran.

The Afghan government, on the other hand, comes to the negotiations trying to keep its rule intact. Ghani has stressed three issues that are important to his government going forward: the importance of democratic elections, the rule of democratic law based on the Afghan constitution, and the legitimacy of his rule as the elected president of Afghanistan until the end of his term in 2025 (Zucchino, 2021). The difficulty with the Afghan government’s position in the negotiations is that it does not leave room for the Taliban to join the government. In addition, the Kabul government is pushing for a ceasefire. The level of violence is clearly too high and is eroding popular support for the government. In the February 2020 agreement, the Taliban agreed to cease hostile actions against United States forces, but it did not agree to cease hostile actions against Afghan forces. In fact, the Taliban has increased attacks on Afghan military posts and personnel and has gained control of large chunks of Afghanistan, including areas near and surrounding Kabul itself (Vendrall, 2021).

Violence in Kabul

The level of violence in Afghanistan has markedly increased in the last year, especially in Kabul, which until recently had been relatively free of it. In past years, the fighting usually slowed down in the winter as snow and cold weather made it difficult. Not this year. According to a survey by ToloNews, the violence in Afghanistan has surged by 50 percent over recent months, even as the peace talks have been underway (ToloNews, 2021).

On February 11, 2021, attackers killed five Afghan policemen escorting a United Nations convoy on the main highway leading into Kabul. Also, on February 11, 2021, a chain of bomb explosions targeted the Kabul police, killing a district police chief and his bodyguard and wounding five people (Akhgar, 2021). These killings have included not only military personnel, but also journalists, government officials, aid workers, and university students. In the past, killings were accomplished by shootings and suicide bombers, but more recently by explosives attached to the bottoms of cars. Called, “sticky” bombs, these explosives are then detonated remotely or set off by a timer.

The terrorists have especially gone after journalists. In the last six months, over 50 journalists and reporters have been killed. Saba Sahar, one of Afghanistan’s first women film directors and her driver were shot, although she survived (Hassan, 2020). This increased level of violence has several effects. Killing reporters and journalists makes reporting on terrorists’ activities more dangerous and thus reduces coverage. The increase in killings also weakens the support for the Ghani government which seems unable, or unwilling, to stop the carnage.

The Taliban have denied having anything to do with the increased violence. While the Taliban no doubt bare some responsibility for the killings, it may be that other terrorist groups are involved. Specifically, the Islamic State insurgents are active in parts of Afghanistan and have been known to attack religious groups that do not adhere to their strict Islamic beliefs. This includes members of the Sikh and Hindu communities and, more importantly, Shia Afghans who have been the targets of recent attacks. The killings may also be the work of rogue Taliban units, such as the Hakkani network that is operating out of Pakistan and supported by Pakistan’s military.

Interim Government

As the negotiations in Doha between the Afghan government and the Taliban languish and the Ghani government in Kabul struggles with violence and corruption, the momentum for forming an interim, or transitional, government continues to grow. The impetus for an interim government comes from several directions.

For one, when there is a peace deal with the Taliban, Taliban leaders and Taliban ideas of Islamic governance will have to be incorporated into the Afghan governmental structure. This will be almost impossible with the present government, but more likely if there is an interim government in power that would be open to the incorporation of Taliban ideas. In addition, there is growing feeling that one of the major obstacles to peace is President Ghani himself who seems unwilling to compromise in dealing with the Taliban. Therefore, it would make sense, some Afghan politicians have suggested, to form an interim government, led by Afghan leaders who are more neutral, or at least open, to incorporating the Taliban into the governmental structure (Gul, 2020).

President Ghani continues to argue that he was elected president of Afghanistan in the 2019 presidential elections and that he rules according to a constitution that was approved by the Afghan people through a loya Jirga. He maintains that he will serve out his five-year term ending in 2025. To change this, he argues, would violate the will of the Afghan people and bring chaos to Afghanistan. He has surrounded himself with Afghan leaders who are strongly anti-Taliban, including First Vice President Sarwar Danish, the former intelligence chief and a staunch anti-Taliban figure. In addition, Ghani has reappointed as a senior advisor Mohammed Mohaqiq, a former anti-Taliban commander and a leader of the Shia Hazara community which fears the return of the Taliban.

However, outside of Ghani’s tight circle of supporters, the call for an interim or transitional government grows. In an online discussion arranged with the U.S. Institute of Peace, Abdullah Abdullah, the head of the Afghan High Council for National Reconciliation and the leader of the Afghan delegation at the Doha peace talks, when asked about the Taliban’s proposal for an interim government, said: “We have to be flexible in our thoughts. Nothing should derail us from getting to a long durable, lasting and acceptable peace” (Gul, 2020). These remarks were interpreted to mean that he would consider an interim government. Several other Afghan leaders are leaning towards supporting an interim government. Atta Mohammed Noor, a powerful regional leader, has supported the idea, as has Amin Ahmadi, a member of the Afghan government’s negotiating team.

Ross Wilson, the senior United States diplomat in Kabul, has denied that Washington is advocating for an interim government, reporting that “the outcomes of Afghanistan Peace Negotiations are up to the Afghans and we believe those outcomes should reflect the wishes and aspirations of the Afghan people” (Bezhan, 2021). However, behind the scenes, Khalilzad visited Kabul in early January of this year to sound out the possibility of an interim government with Afghan leaders. He did not meet with Ghani (Bezhan, 2021).

While an interim government may move the stalled negotiations forward, it may also create chaos and destabilize an already fragile country. President Ghani may not be well-liked and presents a major obstacle to the negotiations with the Taliban, but the country sits on the precipice of civil war. The anarchy and chaos that followed the resignation of President Mohammed Najibullah in 1992 after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan remains on Afghans’ minds. Najibullah announced his intention to form an interim government that would include the Mujahedin. Instead, state institutions broke down and a devastating civil war followed that ultimately brought in the Taliban in 1996. Najibullah was brutally tortured and executed in 1996. This history is not lost on President Ghani, who said at an event in Washington last year: “Dr. Najibullah made the mistake of his life by announcing he was going to resign… Please don’t ask us to replay a film that we know well” (Bezhan, 2021). President Ghani and ex-president Najibullah are from the same tribe.

Summary

Afghanistan appears stuck. The negotiations with the Taliban are on hold, the level of violence is high, a new administration in Washington is reexamining its commitment to Kabul, and the call for an interim government is growing. Kabul now waits to see what the new Biden team will do. If the Biden team moves to renegotiate the agreement with the Taliban and keep American troops in Afghanistan beyond this May, then Kabul and President Ghani can relax, although not for long. However, if the Biden team decides to honor the February 2020 agreement and remove American troops from Afghanistan by May of 2021, then the Taliban will have won and the Ghani government in Kabul will be in a very difficult position. Afghanistan has been at war for over 40 years, with 20 of those years involving the United States. While the end of Afghanistan’s troubles is in sight, the final ending still remains distant.

References

Afzal, M. (2021, February 10). May 2021 should not be seen as a unilateral deadline for the United States to leave Afghalnistn. Retrieved from Brookings: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/02/10/may-2021-should-not-be-seen-as-a-unilateral-deadline-for-the-united-states-to-leave-afghanistan/

Akhgar, T. (2021, February 10). Afghan Officials: Kabul Bombs Kill Police Chief, Bodyguard. Retrieved from AP News: https://apnews.com/article/kabul-police-taliban-afghanistan-1a65e8b034e34948f0f482d242fa7afb

Bezhan, F. (2021, January 14). Would an Afghan Interim Government Help or Hinder Peace Efforts? Retrieved from Gandhara: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghan-peace-talks-settlement-taliban-government/31046739.html

Gul, A. (2020, June 24). Afghan Officials Open to Discussion Interim goernment with Taliban. Retrieved from Voice of America: https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/afghan-official-open-discussing-interim-government-taliban

Hassan, S. (2020, December 27). Targeted Killings of Journalists ae on the Rise Across Afghanistan. Retrieved from The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/targeted-killings-of-journalists-are-on-the-rise-across-afghanistan/2020/12/26/a2a2103c-3efc-11eb-b58b-1623f6267960_story.html

Ignatius, D. (2021, February 4). Afghanistan is Biden’s first big foreign policy headache. Retrieved from The Wshington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/afghanistan-is-bidens-first-big-foreign-policy-headache/2021/02/04/133e697a-6735-11eb-886d-5264d4ceb46d_story.html

ToloNews. (2021, February 09). Four Government Employees Killed in Kabul. Retrieved from Four Government Employees Killed In Kabul: https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-169879#google_vignette

Vendrall, F. (2021, Febraury 14). Mediation or Facilitation would help in the Doha Talks. Retrieved from Afghan Analysts Network: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/aan-qa-mediation-or-facilitation-would-help-in-the-doha-talks/

Further Reading on E-International Relations



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Boeing begins production of newest T-7A aircraft

Boeing begins production of newest T-7A aircraft


This month, American plane-maker Boeing started assembly on a U.S. Air Force’s all-new advanced trainer aircraft calls the T-7A Red Hawk at its factory in St. Louis, Mo.

The training jet was fully designed using 3D model-based definition and data management systems developed at Boeing during the last two decades. The T-7A Red Hawk employed the digital engineering and design of the Boeing T-X aircraft that went from firm concept to first flight in just 36 months.

“The future of air dominance lies in the ability to move quickly, take smart risks and partner in new ways to get the job done,” said Shelley Lavender, Boeing senior vice president of Strike, Surveillance and Mobility. “By creating aircraft and systems along a digital thread, we can accelerate build times and increase quality and affordability for our customers in a way that has never been done before.”

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The T-7A Red Hawk, manufactured by Boeing, introduces capabilities that prepare pilots for fifth generation fighters, including: high-G environment, information/sensor management, high angle of attack flight characteristics, night operations, and transferable air-to-air and air-to-ground skills.

As noted by the company, the Advanced Pilot Training System also incorporates leading-edge ground-based live and virtual simulators to give students and instructors a “real as it gets” experience.

In September 2018, the U.S. Air Force awarded Boeing a $9.2 billion contract to supply 351 advanced trainer aircraft and 46 associated ground-based training simulators. Saab is teamed with Boeing on the trainer and provides the aft fuselage of the jet.

“This is a historic moment for the program and industry,” said Chuck Dabundo, Boeing vice president of T-7 Programs. “The build process leverages full-size determinant assembly, which allows technicians to build the aircraft with minimal tooling and drilling during the assembly process. The digital process accounts for a 75% increase in first-time quality.”

Boeing is the world’s largest aerospace company and leading provider of commercial airplanes, defense, space and security systems, and global services. As a top U.S. exporter, the company supports commercial and government customers in more than 150 countries and leverages the talents of a global supplier base. Building on a legacy of aerospace leadership, Boeing continues to lead in technology and innovation, deliver for its customers and invest in its people and future growth.

According to the U.S. Air Force, the first T-7A aircraft and simulators are scheduled to arrive at Joint Base San Antonio-Randolph, Texas, in 2023. All undergraduate pilot training bases will eventually transition from the T-38C to the T-7A. Those bases include: Columbus Air Force Base, Mississippi; Laughlin AFB, Texas; Sheppard AFB, Texas and Vance AFB, Oklahoma.





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India ‘cow science’ exam put off amid ‘controversy over syllabus’ | India News

India ‘cow science’ exam put off amid ‘controversy over syllabus’ | India News


Thursday’s exam postponed indefinitely after allegations of fake claims and pseudoscience.

A nationwide examination on “cow science” in India has been postponed indefinitely after widespread criticism over the propagation of unscientific claims about the animal, which is considered sacred by the country’s Hindu majority.

The Rashtriya Kamdhenu Aayog (RKA) or National Cow Commission, set up by the ruling Hindu nationalist government, was to organise the online exam on Thursday.

The syllabus for the exam sparked controversy, with media reporting that it contained unscientific claims such as that cow milk has traces of gold in it and earthquakes occur due to cow slaughter.

“The government’s animal husbandry department, under which the commission functions, shelved the exam because of the controversy and furore over the syllabus,” an official at the commission said, requesting anonymity.

“The exam was the brainchild of RKA Chairman Vallabhbhai Kathiria whose term ended on February 20. The department will supervise the commission till a new chairman is appointed,” he added.

The Hindu newspaper reported that the department had disowned the exam which promoted fake claims and pseudoscience.

The commission had “no mandate” to conduct such an examination and any future awareness programme would be conducted on a “scientific basis,” the report said, citing department officials.

The exam, aimed at promoting and protecting the cow, was open for children and adults as well as non-resident Indians, and was to be held in 12 regional languages besides Hindi and English, officials said.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party, which came to power in 2014, named protection of cows a priority to shore up Hindu support among its electoral base.

The government launched programmes to research the uses of cow milk, dung and urine which, according to ancient Indian Ayurveda medicine, have healing properties.





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Brittany Higgins Files Police Report on Parliament House Rape Claim

Brittany Higgins Files Police Report on Parliament House Rape Claim


In the days since all four women went public, Prime Minister Morrison has announced several inquiries into areas such as workplace culture, how sexual abuse allegations are handled by the government and what his own office knew about the alleged assault of Ms. Higgins at the time. Some of the investigations will be conducted by government ministers and others by independent agencies, he said.

Critics have said the government’s response has been lackluster. Governmental inquiries, they say, are likely to fall short of the kind of drastic cultural shift required to change attitudes toward women in Parliament and beyond.

“A review is a political Band-Aid,” said Rachael Burgin, a lecturer in criminology at Swinburne University of Technology in Melbourne. “I’ve seen nothing from anyone in the government to suggest that they’ve taken it seriously enough to see some substantive change,” Dr. Burgin added.

Others have questioned Mr. Morrison’s claims that he had no knowledge of the alleged assault when it first occurred. Mr. Morrison has said he did not know about it until Feb. 12. He has since asked Phil Gaetjens, the secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to conduct an inquiry.

Ms. Higgins’s former boss in Parliament, Defense Minister Linda Reynolds, has also apologized to Ms. Higgins, especially for holding a meeting about the alleged assault in the same room where it had occurred. On Wednesday, as Ms. Reynolds was set to discuss her handling of the allegations, she was hospitalized, citing existing medical conditions.

Ms. Higgins has said that she is “determined to drive significant reform in the way the Australian Parliament handles issues of this nature and treats ministerial and parliamentary staff more generally.” She said that, for example, in 2019, an employee in the prime minister’s office had refused to provide her with access to the closed-circuit television footage from the evening of the alleged assault.

“Brittany Higgins is giving us an opportunity here to actually fix something,” said Clare O’Neil, a member of the opposition Labor Party. “This is a nation’s Parliament. We should be setting the standard, not the floor.”



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The Future of Constitutional Republic United States Hangs by a Thin Thread

The Future of Constitutional Republic United States Hangs by a Thin Thread


Saving the Constitutional Republic much depends on every American.

Are you one of those free and brave Americans?

Does anyone recall the 2017 domestic terrorism? In 2017 a Bernie Sanders supporter, unhinged by Bernie’s medical care lies, targeted the Republican Congressional baseball team’s practice, shooting and almost killing Rep. Steve Scalise and injuring others. No one showed much of a shock or hardly cared and the seriousness of “the incident” was lost in the following day’s “other” news.

In 2018, during Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court justice confirmation, a demented crowd, among them feminists who worried about their “right” to kill babies in the womb, descended on the Capitol and wildly protested. The media hardly reported the event, the public was ill-informed and the result was that very few people really paid attention to the mayhem. Almost no one seemed to care.

The summer of 2020 was hotter than hot all over the United States. Pathetically and sadly, many major American city were set on fire by criminals, branded as “Black Lives Matter” (BLM) and Antifa. These thugs ran amok in Democrat-controlled cities, with destructively wild behavior, and much encouragement from the political Left. They acted with impunity, while the police were in retreat mode, and it appeared no one really cared while the horror of rioting, arson and destruction was taking place.

The political Left has some tactics to be marveled at. When the Left has something they can use for their agenda of political gain, they tell their supporters “it is time to do something.”

arise and be heard for the Constitutional Republic. Banner by NewsBlaze.com
Arise and be heard for the Constitutional Republic. Banner by NewsBlaze.com

The left says they do thing “for our [the people’s] safety,” but in reality they do it to gain more political control over many of our freedoms. This was the reason they orchestrated kicking the sitting President of the United States off Internet platforms. They disconnected him from his supporters at the worst possible time, and his leadership messages went quiet.

What We, the People, must keep in mind is that what the left does has nothing to do with keeping any of us safe. It has everything to do with a political gain for them. It is another opportunity for the Left, for once and for all to strip us, We, the People, of our rights.

Their first goal was to strip our First Amendment, the right to freedom of speech. This is an inalienable right under The Constitution.

Given their success from having Big Tech silence Donald Trump and others, the Left think they have an excuse to do what they have always wanted to do: to silence all of their political opposition by any means, using any tool and for any reason.

For those Who Do Not Want To Be Silenced

We now have major goals to tackle and actions are required without delay:

  1. WIN the House and Senate in 2022; this requires to start working on it TODAY;
  2. Use all the anti-trust laws to break up the monopolies, i.e., Apple and Google, Twitter, that think they have become “masters” over We, the People. They now really think it is up to them to decide what information we can access and have; how we are “allowed” to communicate, and what our mouth can utter.
  3. Expose the intertwined connectivity of the Democrat National Committee (DNC) and Silicon Valley’s big-tech oligarchs.

The un-American radical Democrats and their tech executive henchmen don’t care who you are or where you were on January 6th, 2021. If they decide that you are a threat to their agenda to control America, they want to shut you up and shut you down, cancel you – and speedily. That must end.

Just keep in mind that all these shenanigans are larger than just Twitter or Facebook feeds; for that matter any social media website’s feed. Rather, it is about our inalienable rights to free speech; more so, our rights to our opinion and our rights to exist as individuals and as a free society.

The Democrat Party has now turned out to be a radical Left party, that wants to and is already taking away the rights from US – We, the People. They want to control our right to our opinion, and our right to exist as individuals and as a free society. And now they have made a pipeline to Big Tech to do exactly that.

Hypocrisy on Display

The same people who told Jack Phillips, the owner of a Christian bakery who won a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case over his refusal to make a wedding cake for a gay couple, to “shut up and bake the cake” for a wedding that conflicted with his faith now claim that Twitter is a private company that can do as it pleases.

Their hypocrisy is so rancid it is beyond any civilized society’s comprehension.

Now that Twitter, a tweeting company that overnight took the role of being more powerful than the leader of the free world, the President of the United States, is doing the bidding of the Democrat Party, does this case still stand? Not really.

While Twitter, Facebook and other “social media” claim to be “private companies” manned by Democrat Party campaigns, candidates and committee member alumni, they use their ‘swampy’ manpower to crush any and all political opponents. They are protected by law.

Discover the Networks (originally Discover the Network) (DtN), launched in 2004, is a website run by current Editor-in-Chief David Horowitz of the David Horowitz Freedom Center, focusing on individuals and groups, and history of groups alleged to be politically Left wing.

By using DtNe database one can spearhead an investigation into the Big-Tech decision makers and their ties to the Democrat Party. The stakes are mammoth. The Left is not about making America a better place or Making America Great Again. It is about destroying the greatest country in the world. Joseph Biden’s list of executive orders at the stroke of a pen is the proof that they are all in to destroy this country.

Todays political Left possess radical Marxist ideology, bordering on fascism. Exposing them and taking action against them is the remedy to keep America the country of the free and the brave.

To achieve this, patriotism and valor are required. Uniting under the banner of exposing these un-American charlatans for who they are and revealing their true malicious intentions to America and the American people is imperative, lest We, the People, are willing to lose our country to them and forever.

The Beginning

Do not kid yourself, what we are seeing now taking place is just the very beginning. The end results will be disastrous; It cannot be any other way if not stopped.

We must be truthful to ourselves. If the [un]social media was able to get away with permanently kicking President Donald Trump off the internet and cut him from all direct communication with his millions of supporters, certainly there is no telling what they can and will do to our country and to us, We, the People, like you and me.

To win, the Left needs us, their opposition, to remain silent. Without our silence they remain afraid. That is the reason they keep the National Guardsmen in their Washington D.C. backyard. That is why they exploited to the maximum the January 6, 2021 breach of the Capitol. There was no investigation, rather a retaliatory action.

Seventy five million Americans, supporters of ‘America The Great’ movement have been hiding, hopefully just under a small mole hill. I hope this is very temporary.

The voices of seventy five million Americans, supporters of “America The Great,” must be heard before it is too late.

Keep in mind that this country belongs to We, the People, not a bunch of politicians or political operative, not the swamp. The future of We, the People, our children and grandchildren is in a country that is now hanging by a thread. Even a slight change can decide what will happen and that could even be a bad result, such as war, deaths, failure of the country’s constitutional system, unrest, etc.

All of these things are possible.

Arise and let your voice be heard. Do not allow your rights to be stripped away.



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